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CRITICAL THEORY AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: 






This brief essay suggests that the discursive practices associated 
with Critical Legal Studies and related movements have prescriptive 
implications for institutional design.  The essay, a contribution to a 
festschrift for David M. Trubek, considers the trajectory of Trubek’s 
work from his engagement with various critical projects to his recent 
sympathetic interpretation of “new governance” in the European Union.  
The tacit prescriptive implications of the critical work resonate with 
some of the distinctive institutional features found in new governance. 
 
 
 David Trubek has played major roles in three important scholarly 
movements: Law and Development, Law and Society, and Critical Legal 
Studies.  A major theme of his efforts has been critique.  Most often, 
Trubek has allied with or engaged sympathetically those who have 
challenged mainstream or established discourse in the name of 
egalitarian and democratic values. 
 The relation of critical analysis to constructive social practice is 
an issue that has dogged – some might say, embarrassed -- scholarship 
for a long time.  Some critical scholars disclaim responsibility to 
consider the practical implications of their work.  Others have implied by 
their adoption of conventional left positions that bear no visible influence 
of their theoretical work that critique functions only defensively, warding 
off unreflective conservatism to create a space for unreflective 
progressivism.  Trubek, however, has insisted from the beginning of his 
career that critique could and should inform practice, while conceding 
that the ways in which it did so were not fully understood or readily 
generalized.   
 Now in the latest phase of his career, he has devoted himself to a 
project whose main ambiguity concerns, not its practical implications, 
but the extent to which it involves critique.  In a series of collaborations, 
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he has provided a sympathetically descriptive account of recent 
developments in public policy and administration known as “new 
governance”.  This move makes Trubek a promising case for 
reconsideration of the question of the relation of critique and 
prescription.  His earlier, largely critical work was exceptionally 
articulate about the practical implications of critique.  And his current 
work is much more prescriptive than most practitioners of critical theory 
ever get.  So it’s appropriate to consider how the earlier work relates to 
the later. 
 In important respects, new governance, in the form Trubek 
portrays optimistically, is distinctively responsive to the critical themes 
in his earlier work.  There is a normative criterion of political legitimacy 
in much critical theory.  It is occasionally explicit – notably in Jurgen 
Habermas’s work – but more often implicit.  The criterion is this: 
political institutions acquire presumptive legitimacy to the extent that 
they anticipate and incorporate the discursive practices exemplified by 
critical scholarship.  Legitimate government institutionalizes centrally 
and continuously in its public decision-making processes the practices of 
critical reflection and interrogation that critical theory models in 
scholarship.  This general principle leads some more specific ones.  
When we measure new governance in the manifestations that Trubek 
approves we see at least important commitments and progress in the 
direction of these principles. 
 I first consider what Trubek’s earlier work suggests about the 
practical implications of critique.  Then I consider how these 
implications play out in the case of new governance.  Throughout the 
discussion, I refer to Critical Legal Studies practitioners, as well as the 
self-identified critical practitioners within Law-and-Development and 
Law-and-Society, collectively as “Crits”.   
 
 I. Critical Principles 
 
 I start with what I hope will be an uncontroversial summary of 
key features of critical theoretical practice in the three legal scholarly 
movements to which Trubek has contributed, and in particular, in 
Trubek’s own work.    
 1. Anti-foundationalism.  The Crits ally themselves with the 
modernist denial that knowledge can be grounded in some ultimate 
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reality that exists independently of our efforts to understand.  The 
version central to CLS emphasized a particular variation on this claim --
the indeterminacy of doctrine.  It conceded that there were (or might be) 
abstract values that were compelling and uncontroversial but denied that 
there was any neutral method which would generate from these values 
answers to particular conflicts.  The Crits emphasized the ways in which 
conventional legal analysis tacitly smuggled conclusions into its 
premises by framing issues to bracket some concerns, by selectively 
invoking governing values to obscure the extent to which they were in 
conflict, or by dogmatically asserting non-sequiturs. 
 Law-and-society people tended to treat the indeterminacy claim 
as too obvious to require demonstration, and they were somewhat 
surprised and perhaps annoyed that CLS work drew the attention and 
controversy it did.  But Trubek disagreed.  Theoretically, doctrinal 
criticism made an essential, though limited, contribution to explaining 
the mechanisms by which law legitimated power.  Strategically, it seems 
to have been necessary to engage the legal establishment in the larger 
critical project.  Without it, mainstream legal academics found it too easy 
to dismiss critique as irrelevant to professional practice.
1
     
 2. Anti-determinism.  To begin with, this principle meant a 
rejection of the Marxist idea that there is some material base independent 
of an ideological superstructure and that the base determined the super-
structure.  More broadly, it disputed that there is a limited repertory of 
tightly structured forms that a modern society can take.  There is no 
reason to believe that contemporary capitalist societies exhaust the 
possible range of market-based societies or that the economic 
productivity of some of these societies necessarily entails their 
inegalitarian and anti-democratic features. 
 A lot of critical work has pursued this theme historically; so there 
has been particular attention to its evolutionary variant – the claim that 
poor societies must past through a well-defined path to emerge as 
prosperous capitalist democracies.  Trubek contributed to this critique at 
both theoretical and practical levels.  In his work on Weber, he 
elaborated what the master himself had recognized as the “England 
problem” – a key counter-example to his contention that capitalist 
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development depended on formally rational legal rules (as opposed to the 
more informal style of common-law judging).
2
  In his Brazilian work, 
Trubek engaged the prescriptive uses of evolutionary determinism.  He 
showed that in the politically and economically oligarchical conditions 
of Brazil, the prescriptions inferred by the determinists (liberalized 
capital markets, purposive legal reasoning) turned out not to be 
conducive to development (much less the democracy for which some had 
also hoped).
3
   
 3. Anti-ideology.  This is best term I can think of to describe 
opposition to unreflective privileging of the status quo.  (“Utopian” 
would be another, but it has connotations of both intellectual flakiness 
and programmatic daring, neither of which is deserved by the Crits.)  All 
of the practices to which the Crits object contribute to this privileging, 
but two are especially important. 
 The first is the valorization of the normative commitments 
proclaimed by established institutions.  Doctrinal scholars do this when 
they assume that the collection of authoritative reference points on 
particular legal questions reflects some immanent rationality and proceed 
to construct an account that makes it look harmonious and grounded in 
basic values.  The “gap” scholarship of interdisciplinary scholars does 
something similar.  It focuses on a particular piece of positive law and 
proceeds to document the extent to which its presumed prescriptive 
implications are unfulfilled in practice.  It then proceeds in one of two 
directions.  Either it suggests that non-enforcement reflects some “latent 
function” performed by self-equilibrating social processes.  For example, 
maybe the law – for example, prohibition of alcohol -- was a “symbolic 
crusade” designed to ease the pain of status loss for a declining elite 
rather than to affect mass behavior.  More commonly, the scholar 
assumes that society would benefit from more enforcement and offers 
prescriptions as to how to accomplish this.  The latter approach is less 
conservative, but it is still ideological in assuming that there is a social 
interest in closing the gap simply because the norm satisfies positivist 
criteria of legality.   
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 The second practice the Crits question is the valorization of social 
peace and harmony.  The Law-and-Society Crits produced a large body 
of analysis and research in response to policy discourse of dispute 
resolution.  They showed that it is a mistake to assume, as conventional 
discourse does, that the emergence of disputes is exogenous to the legal 
system or that their minimization is an uncontroversial social good.  
Legal professionals do not just respond to claims and grievances; they 
generate and influence them.  Their advice can turn disappointment into 
indignation, whining into claiming.  To the extent that professionals 
facilitate effective collective action, they may increase confidence and 
solidarity in ways that reinforce and re-shape claims.  Conversely, 
professionals can also “cool out” clients in ways that reduce expectations 
and induce resignation.  It follows that “dispute resolution” is not 
necessarily a good thing.  Much social progress has required dispute 
generation.  And much of what passes for dispute resolution involves the 
dampening of potentially progressive political impulses.  Of course, the 
distinction between progressive and regressive change depends on 
political criteria.  The Crits’ point is that political criteria are inevitable, 
and they are best made explicit. 
Trubek engaged both gap sociology and the dispute resolution 
literature in his synthetic essays.
4
  With respect to dispute resolution, he 
also contributed directly to the Law-and-Society critique of the 
“litigation explosion” ideology that portrayed litigation as a 
metastasizing social cancer.  The research showed that litigation was less 
prevalent and less expensive than conventional rhetoric claimed.
5
 
 4. Anti-separation-of-powers.  Conventional discourse presumes 
a strong separation between enactment of law and its enforcement.  
Enactment settles issues of value; enforcement implements the 
settlement.  Enactment occurs through relatively democratic processes; 
enforcement occurs through relatively technocratic ones. Thus, particular 
enforcement decisions have democratic legitimacy to the extent that they 
implement democratic commands.  The Weberian view of bureaucracy 
as a mechanism for automatic implementation of hierarchically-
promulgated norms through formal rules fits helpfully into the picture.  
                                                 
4
  David M. Trubek and John Esser, Critical Empiricism and American Legal 
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  David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA Law 
Review 33 (1984). 
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In the legal academy, the picture is complicated by the acknowledgement 
that enacted law is characteristically ambiguous and therefor requires the 
interpretive efforts of lawyers and judges.  In both the popular and the 
professional views, the action is at the top – legislators, judges, and elite 
lawyers make the critical decisions that are then passively implemented 
by the foot soldiers of the state. 
 All the Crits insist that the output of top level legislative and 
interpretive activity remains too ambiguous to determine street-level 
decisions (and even if it were determinate, top-level officials lack the 
practical capacity to enforce compliance by subordinates).  The 
interdisciplinary Crits follow the point up by shifting attention to the 
street level.  In myriad studies, they showed that street-level 
administration is not a process of passive implementation of centrally-
determined commands.  It is an unmistakably political process in which 
unresolved value questions are settled informally in ways usually 
influenced by social inequality.   
 The interdisciplinary Crits revised the Weberian picture of 
bureaucracy, but they did not reject it entirely.  The difficulties of 
supervision and the rigidities of rules made bureaucracy a cumbersome 
tool for most social problems, but a bureaucratic program that would 
regulate narrowly and tolerate a lot of over-inclusion relative to social 
need might work.  An example was non-means tested public assistance 
that provided benefits to, say, all families with children regardless of 
income.  But to the extent that more precise targeting was needed, 
bureaucracy would not work.  In the tradition of social theory, the 
prominent alternative was Durkheim’s idea of public service 
professionalism -- discretion canalized by socialization and peer review.  
Unfortunately, another body of research showed that such street level 
public servants often exercised discretion in irresponsible and oppressive 
ways. 
 Trubek was not directly involved in the Crit work on street-level 
administration, but he was strongly associated with it.  His Wisconsin 
colleague Joel Handler was a key figure.  And so was Louise Trubek, 
both as scholar and practitioner. 
  




 The way to infer the practical implications of this critical practice 
is to ask what kinds of institutions would be immune to it.  Not immune 
in the sense that the institutions had solved all the problems that critique 
might reveal.  But immune in the sense that the institutions had fully 
internalized the critical practices.  Or coopted them in the sense, not of 
neutralizing them, but of incorporating them full bore into its standard 
operating procedures.  Taking this approach, we can infer four conditions 
of presumptive political legitimacy.  I have named the four conditions 
after friends, collaborators, and people whom Trubek has acknowledged 
as influences.  The four conditions do not constitute a complete political 
vision.  They presuppose some variation of the conventional elements of 
liberal democracy, such as fair electoral process and civil and welfare 
rights.  But they add an additional set of criteria sometimes overlooked 
that critical theory emphasizes and deepens. 
1. The Habermas condition.  Public norms should ideally be 
based on consensus among affected citizens derived through a process of 
open, respectful, and non-coercive discourse.  Crits in the U.S. legal 
academy have been ambivalent about Habermas and the discourse 
principle, but Trubek suggested in 1984 that they might need it.
6
  The 
consensus ideal responds to the practical dilemma that follows the 
rejection of foundationalism.  Consensus is modernity’s substitute for 
traditional and rationalist normative foundations.
7
  While the Crit 
reservations are important (see the next condition), they don’t leave the 
idea without utility. 
 Consensus is not a pre-requisite for collective action.  It is 
impractical for most decisions, and it would be unjust to give those who 
benefit from the status quo a veto over proposed changes.  The 
consensus condition just means that we should seek consensus to the 
extent that is practical and we should have more confidence in our 
judgments to the extent that we achieve it.  The condition is a useful 
heuristic even though it is unlikely ever to be fully satisfied for any 
complex problem.  As long as we can measure the proximity of actual 
circumstances to the consensus ideal, it can serve as a useful measure of 
legitimacy.  Note this approach differs from claims of legitimacy based 
on the imagined possibility of consent in some hypothetical situation like 
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  Where the Action Is, cited in note   , at 597-98. 
7
  See Maeve Cooke, Habermas and Consensus, 1 European Journal of 
Philosophy 247 (1993). 
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the Original Position.  Here we measure legitimacy by the distance 
between idealized consent and the quality of consent in the actual 
decision-making process. 
 2. The Kennedy condition:  This condition is the negative 
implication of the Anti-Foundationalist position.  It requires that public 
policy and practice be formulated and implemented with maximum 
feasible self-consciousness and transparency.  Official decision-makers 
should forbear from efforts to give their conclusions a veneer of 
necessity or entailment.  There are many Crits whose names we could 
plausibly attach to this condition, but I name it after Duncan Kennedy 
because he has been a major influence on Trubek and because he is 
probably the legal scholar most identified with the position that critique 
tends to have progressive political effects.
8
 
 Kennedy’s critical practice has been focused on elite judicial and 
academic discourse.  Some Law-and-Society scholars carried on this 
project at the level of street-level discourse of low-status lawyers and 
low-level public officials.  With their work in mind, we could have 
called this principle the “Amherst condition” after the group of scholars 
centered in Amherst, Massachusetts, whose work Trubek analyzed 




 But from either the top or the bottom, the condition is the same.  
For official decision-makers and their apologists, it requires self-
consciousness and candor about the inconclusive and conflicted nature of 
the authority they invoke, recognition of relevant competing values, and 
acknowledgement of the political quality of the decision-making process.  
For advocates and advisors, it means willingness to acknowledge their 
own relevant interests and anxieties, to empathetically explore their 
clients concerns, and to frame advice in a way that maximizes clients’ 
understanding of the range of possibilities and the nature of the 
constraints that they face.  
 3. The Unger condition: Entrenched social practices and 
structures should be subject to institutionalized pressures that encourage 
challenge and induce re-examination.  This condition resonates with the 
rejection of ideology.  It is named after Roberto Unger, another Trubek 
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The Unger condition requires the protection and, indeed, 
encouragement of diversity in public and private life.  In the public 
sphere, it requires opportunities to challenge concentrated private power 
through antitrust-type protections and irresponsible public agencies 
through means such as “public law litigation”.  In social life, it prescribes 
a kind of education that develops a capacity to thrive in circumstances of 
diversity and to distance one’s self reflectively from convention. 
 The Unger condition is designed as an antidote to the tendency of 
consensus and cooperation to congeal into unreflective and dysfunctional 
conformity.  It is, of course, potentially in tension with the Habermas 
condition, and managing that tension is a critical goal of institutional 
design. 
 4. The Sabel condition:  Institutions and programs should be 
designed so that their purposes can be re-considered and elaborated in 
the course of implementation.  Institutions should facilitate learning, 
self-assessment, and re-orientation.  They must combine transparency 
and provisionality.  Institutional goals should be articulated along with 
performance measures, and both goals and measures should be 
reconsidered continuously in the light of experience.  Practice norms 
should be fully explicit, but they should not require agents to take actions 
that contravene the purposes of the program.  When rules conflict with 
purposes, the response should be neither counter-purposive compliance 
nor low-visibility adjustment.  The agent should disregard the rule and 
take the action that furthers the programs purpose, while triggering a 
process of review that, if her judgment is sustained, leads to the prompt 
elaboration of the rule to take account of the new contingency.  Peer 
review and the duty-to-explain take the place of Weberian rules in 
controlling discretion.  The Sabel condition erodes the distinction 
between free-standing organizations and federations or associations of 
organizations.  The techniques of rolling rules and peer review can be 
applied across organizations as well as within them. 
 The continuously self-revising organization (a/k/a lean 
production, learning organization, self-managing organization, evidence-
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based practice) has been shown especially effective in the private 
economy with products and markets that require strong customization 
and/or frequent adaptation to new circumstances.  Many public problems 
now seem to call for the same contextualizing and adaptive capacities in 
government organizations.  From the point of view of liberal democracy, 
some variations of these organizations are appealing because the 
qualities that make them efficient in dealing with some problems also 
make them conducive to democratic accountability.  Such organizations 
encourage lower-tier administrative creativity and stakeholder 
participation, and they make practice broadly transparent in ways that 
facilitate accountability to upper-tier administrators, coordinate political 
institutions, and the public sphere. 
 The Sabel condition is a negative implication of the rejection of 
the separation of powers, and more generally, of the distinction between 
enactment and enforcement.  It is named after Charles Sabel, who has 
insisted on the pertinence of “continuous improvement” models of 
private organization to the public sphere, and has specifically used such 




 III. New Governance 
 
 The “new governance” idea arises from convergent efforts to 
understand the expanding roles of international organizations, the 
evolution of the European Union, and the trend toward decentralizing 
reforms in policy implementation in a variety of countries, especially the 
U.S. and the U.K.  These developments have many variations, and there 
are many interpretations of their general significance.  The work on the 
EU to which Trubek has contributed has been cautiously optimistic, and 
it thus converges with work on international organization and domestic 
policy reform that views at least some manifestations of the new 
developments as promising.  I will not try to assess the plausibility of 
this cautious optimism about the EU, a task complicated by the current 
economic crisis.  I will limit myself to pointing out those features in 
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  Charles F. Sabel, Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic 
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in Governing Work and Welfare in a New Economy (Jonathan Zeitlin and David 
Trubek, ed.s, 2003). 
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Trubek’s account of the EU that seem responsive to the institutional 
implications of critique.  (I attribute these ideas only to Trubek, even 
though he developed them in a series of collaborations, and I don’t try to 
take account of how the ideas overlap and resonate with the large new 
governance literature.  Trubek might have preferred a less Trubek-centric 
account, but that is not what the occasion calls for.) 
1. The Habermas condition.  Legally, the EU is an 
intergovernmental organization.  Traditionally, intergovernmental 
organizations operate by consensus among member nations, as 
represented by their diplomats.  As the EU has evolved away from this 
traditional form, the consensus norm has been diluted, but it continues to 
exert influence.  Nonconsensus decisions still require a kind of super-
majority (“qualified majority”), and they can be made only across a 
limited range of competences.  At the same time, engagement across 
member states has thickened, including not just senior executives, but a 
European parliament (though it does not figure in Trubek’s picture) and 
a series of committees and agencies in which mid-level officials, experts, 
and NGO delegates participate.  This combination of a diluted consensus 
norm and a thickened range of cross-national engagement would seem to 
push the EU along a deliberative path. 
 Trubek has been especially interested in the phenomenon of “soft 
law”.  The EES and the OMC create basically procedural duties, and 
even these are not enforceable in any tangibly coercive way.  Yet, they 
seem to have motivated substantive change.  Trubek has analyzed how 
soft law duties might motivate action.  They include “shaming” (fear of 
peer disdain), “mimesis” (a desire to justify your conduct as 
conventional) and “discursive transformation,” which Trubek, following 
Kirsten Jacobson, describes as “the construction of ‘a new perspective 
from which reality can be descried, phenomena classified, positions 
taken, and actions justified’.”
12
  Shaming and mimesis sound more like 
Durkheim than Habermas, and discursive transformation sounds 
uncomfortably like Foucault.  But Trubek also suggests a more 
Habermasian interpretation in which new governance succeeds by “by 
bring[ing] people with diverse perspectives together in settings that 
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 David M. Trubek and Louise G. Trubek, Hard Law and Soft Law in the 
Construction of Social Europe, 11 European Law Journal 343, 357 (2004). 
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require sustained deliberation about problem-solving” that leads them to 
“collectively redefine objectives and policies.”
13
 
 2. The Kennedy condition.  Trubek sees the post-Maastricht EU 
developments, especially the European Employment Strategy and the 
Open Method of Coordination, as cracking open conventional legal and 
political understandings.  “[T]raditional principles of legitimacy drawn 
from state-based models do not work at the European level and may be 
obsolete at the national level as well.”
14
  Notably, there is no visible 
unitary sovereign to which authority can be attributed.  Opponents of the 
EU attack it for failing to conform to conventional assumptions, and 
defenders strain to reconfigure or portray it as only a modest departure.  
But Trubek suggests that practical policy discourse in this terrain has 
been (or is likely to become) significantly unencumbered by ideological 
baggage and more open and reflective. 
 If true, this could be a transitional phenomenon of the sort we 
expect in moments of dramatic reconstruction but that typically wanes as 
new institutional forms are consolidated.  But some of the “mechanisms 
that destabilize existing understandings” in the new arrangements might 
operate long term.  In particular, there is the commitment to diversity 
(the Unger condition) and to experimentation (the Sabel condition).   
 The new governance forms to which Trubek drew attention 
require policy makers both to tolerate and to take account of diverse 
perspectives and practices.  Decision-makers come from different 
national cultures.  Trubek points out that the problems with which EU 
social policy has been pre-occupied straddle the boundaries of academic 
discipline and agency jurisdictions.  This straddling contributes another 
dimension of diversity.  The thinner the base of shared assumptions, the 
greater the pressure to explain, and thus to reflect, on premises that might 
otherwise be taken for granted.  Moreover, the need to take account of 
the range of viable institutional forms in member states subverts the 
tendency to under-estimate the range of viable institutional forms.  At the 
same time, the experimentalist dimension of these reforms requires that 
deliberators submit their premises to the test of experience.  This might 
subvert tendencies to fundamentalist dogmatism.   
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 3.  The Unger condition.  This condition stipulates that consensus 
must not come at the expense of the kinds of diversity that stimulate 
awareness of a broad range of possibility in culture, politics, and the 
economy.  Trubek sees the commitment to diversity as a major strength 
of the EU.  EU consensus is a thin or overlapping consensus that 
contemplates and indeed protects diversity among and within member 
states.  
 Expansion has brought increasing diversity among member 
states, and association appears to have some influence on protection of 
diversity within member states.  The admission process appears to have 
had a significant liberalizing effect on expansion states.  And some of 
these pressures appear to continue among member states.  Gender 
equality and social inclusion are among the declared goals of the 
European Employment Strategy, and there are metrics associated with 
them.   
 A pertinent theme in judicial review of administrative action is 
reduced attention to questions of competence and authority in favor of 
concern with representation and inclusiveness.  For example, Trubek 
sees the EUAPME case as potentially adumbrating a quasi-constitutional 
principle that would condition recognition of the normative output of 
stakeholder regimes on adequate representation of affected interests.
15
 
 4. The Sabel condition.  Trubek has explicitly interpreted the EES 
and the OMC as examples of Sabel’s idea of experimentalist or directly-
deliberative governance.
16
  The basic elements are: general agreement on 
goals and measures of progress toward them, followed by member state 
plans, self-monitoring, and reporting to the EU; followed by peer review, 
followed by reconsideration and re-elaboration of goals and metrics.  All 
part of a continuous cycle.  More recently, Trubek has interpreted 
developments in international law, particularly around the WTO treaties, 
in terms of collaborative problem-solving.
17
 
 As Trubek notes, this approach precludes any strong distinction 
between rule enactment and rule enforcement.   Efforts to implement the 
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norms lead to greater understanding of them both through local 
experience and through the pooling of experiences in the peer review 
process.  Political accountability is re-configured.  Traditional legal 
theory emphasizes a backward-looking process in which courts confine 
administrators to the mandates of generalist legislatures.  In the new 
processes, accountability is more specialized and more prospective.  On 
the one hand, it occurs through the deliberative horizontal engagement of 
parties with special interests and expertise.  On the other, it defers to 
legislatures by making its activities transparent to oversight by 




 IV. Conclusion 
 
 Readers are struck by both the range of Trubek’s scholarship and 
its continued engagement with new events and ideas.  Trubek has never 
sought the benefits of narrow expertise or yielded to the temptation to 
rest on early triumphs.  Yet, there is also a notable continuity in his 
work.  Few people have been more ambitious in their efforts to bring 
critique and prescription together.  It remains to be seen whether new 
governance will prove a durable set of innovations.  It does, however, 
seem deeply responsive to the prescriptive implications of Crit 
scholarship.  No doubt this is not the only programmatic response that 
could be derived from the critiques.  But thanks in important measure to 
Trubek, it is the most elaborated one.   
  
  
